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Thus, as of today, the United States will cease all implementation of the non-binding Paris Accord and the draconian financial and economic burdens the agreement imposes on our country. This includes ending the implementation of the nationally
determined contribution and, very importantly, the Green Climate Fund which is costing the United States a vast fortune.1
*

1.

In memoriam, former Distinguished Lecturer and Legal-Scholar-inResidence, Colorado College.
Press Release, President Donald J. Trump on the Paris Accord (June 1,
2017), https://perma.cc/XW9A-P7KY. President Trump confirmed this decision at the G20 meeting in Hamburg, Germany. G20 Summit, G20 Leader’s Declaration, Shaping an Interconnected World, at 10 (July 7/8, 2017),
https://perma.cc/C8AY-ZK5Q (“We take note of the decision of the United
States of America to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. The United
States of America announced it will immediately cease the implementation
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INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

With the words quoted above, President Trump set a course
to end the United States’ status as a party to the Paris Agreement2 and renounced all activities implementing it. A wide
range of political and business leaders criticized the President’s
decision;3 however, supporters of the coal industry applauded
it.4
In his announcement, President Trump also stated that he
would comply with the withdrawal provision in the Paris
Agreement.5 This Essay argues that, while compliance with that
process may satisfy the treaty obligation, it probably does not
conform to U.S. constitutional standards, and therefore, would
not be binding on the United States.
The argument demonstrating the failure of the President to
satisfy constitutional standards proceeds as follows. Part I develops the context in which the Paris Agreement arose. Part II
briefly summarizes the Paris Agreement. In Part III, I argue
that President Trump’s attempt to cease implementation of the
Paris Agreement and, in effect, withdraw from the treaty, does
not meet U.S. standards required by the Constitution, specifically Article II, § 2, Clause 2.6 Finally, in Part IV, I consider the
question posed in the title of this Essay and conclude that the
answer is probably “no.” In addition, I discuss the destabilization to global governance that would result if the answer were
“yes.”

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

of its current nationally-determined contribution and affirms its strong
commitment to an approach that lowers emissions while supporting economic growth and improving energy security needs. The United States of
America states it will endeavour to work closely with other countries to
help them access and use fossil fuels more cleanly and efficiently and help
deploy renewable and other clean energy sources, given the importance of
energy access and security in their nationally-determined contributions.”).
See generally Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of
the Paris Agreement, Dec. 12, 2015, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1
[hereinafter Paris Agreement], https://perma.cc/R72J-FR62.
See Michael D. Shear, Trump Will Withdraw U.S. From Paris Climate
Agreement, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2017), https://perma.cc/A65P-W2JD.
See id.
Id.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. (“[The President] shall have Power, by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two
thirds of the Senators present concur . . . .”).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/3
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II. A GENEALOGY AND SUMMARY OF THE PARIS
AGREEMENT
The Paris Agreement was negotiated under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”).7
The UNFCCC was opened for signature on June 4, 1992 at the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
(“UNCED” or “Rio Earth Summit”) and entered into force on
March 24, 1994.8 There are currently 197 parties;9 the United
States is one of them.10
Administrative structure is included in the Convention. Article 7 establishes a Conference of the Parties (“COP”) and specifies its duties and authority.11 Article 8 creates a Secretariat as
the executive office,12 and Article 9 calls for a scientific and
technical committee.13
As its name indicates, the UNFCCC is a framework convention; it is widely acknowledged that it contains procedural requirements but not substantive limits on greenhouse gas emissions.14 As the discussion below demonstrates, despite the
absence of limits on greenhouse gas emissions, there are provisions in the Convention that are consequential because they limit the sovereignty of the parties.15

7.
8.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

15.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992,
1771 U.N.T.S 107, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 102-38 (1992) [hereinafter
UNFCCC].
Status of Ratification of the Convention, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON
CLIMATE CHANGE , https://perma.cc/BU5Y-HXH2 (“The Convention entered
into force on 21 March 1994, in accordance with Article 23, that is on the
ninetieth day after the date of deposit of the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.”).
Id.
Id.
UNFCCC, supra note 7, at art. 7 (“A Conference of the Parties is hereby
established.”).
Id. at art. 8.
Id. at art. 9.
See id. at art. 4 (“[Developed States agree to report information] with the
aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels [of emissions of
greenhouse gases subject to the Convention]”) (emphasis added); DAVID
HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 665 (5th
ed. 2015) (“The [UNFCCC] established a general framework, but delineated few specific or substantive obligations to curb climate change.”).
See infra notes 16–24 and accompanying text.
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The important procedural requirements for planning in the
UNFCCC include preparing inventories of greenhouse gas
sources and sinks,16 integrating environmental planning with
economic development,17 and reporting and exchanging relevant
data and plans to mitigate climate change.18 Developed states
must prepare plans to mitigate global climate change by limiting greenhouse gas emissions and enhancing sinks,19 provide
developing states funds to pay for their data collection and distribution,20 and prepare policies that aim to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions to their 1990 levels.21
Other procedural provisions include the establishment of a
fund to aid developing states22 and recognition of the option of
joint implementation.23 Finally, the principle of common but differentiated responsibility is included by dividing the parties into
two groups: Annex I Parties are developed states and non-Annex
I Parties are developing states.24
Each of the provisions is a procedural obligation that requires the parties to yield part of their sovereignty. Although
one only requires developed parties to aim at a reduction to
1990 levels, under the doctrine “pacta sunt servanda,” it also
limits sovereignty.25
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

UNFCCC, supra note 7, at arts. 4.1(a), 12.1(a).
Id. at art. 4.1(f).
Id. at art. 4.1(b).
Id. at art. 4.2(a).
Id. at art. 4.3.
Id. at art. 4.2(b) (emphasis added).
Id. at art. 11.
Id. at art. 4.2(a).
See id. at annex I, II.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (defining pacta sunt servanda as: “[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith”). Although the United States is not a party to the Vienna Convention, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, https://perma.cc/CR5P-6NGF, it has acknowledged
pacta sunt servanda as binding customary international law. See U.N.
Conference on the Law of Treaties, 1st Sess., 29th mtg. at 151, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.39/C1/SR.29 (Apr. 18, 1968) [hereinafter Conference on the Law
of Treaties], https://perma.cc/MJ9C-RFU2 (“Mr. Briggs [on behalf of the
United States] said that the pacta sunt servanda rule had come down
through the ages as a self-evident truth. Both comparative law and the
history of legal systems showed that it had gained universal acceptance; it
had been found to be a legal necessity. The principle had been a basic rule

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/3
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Predecessors of the UNFCCC in the ancestral lineage of the
Paris Agreement include the Kyoto Protocol,26 the Copenhagen
Accord,27 the Cancun Agreements,28 and the Durban Platform
for Enhanced Action.29
The Kyoto Protocol is a top-down treaty that sets limits on
greenhouse gas emissions for Annex I Parties.30 It did not
achieve its objectives primarily because China was classified as
a non-Annex I Party and because the United States refused to
become a party. Thus, the number one and number two emitters
of greenhouse gases were not bound by emission caps.31 The Copenhagen Accord switched to a bottom-up approach in which
each party unilaterally determined its goal for reducing its
greenhouse gas emissions.32

26.
27.

28.
29.

30.
31.

32.

of international law from its earliest origins, and was the foundation-stone
of further progress and development.”).
Making Those First Steps Count: An Introduction to the Kyoto Protocol,
U.N.
FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION
ON
CLIMATE
CHANGE,
https://perma.cc/5WVX-8SD3.
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference
of the Parties on its Fifteenth Session, Held in Copenhagen from 7 to 19 December 2009, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2010),
https://perma.cc/PB4F-32A6.
The Cancun Agreements, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, https://perma.cc/NQF5-A2HC.
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Report of the Conference
on the Parties on its Seventeenth Session, Held in Durban from 28 November to 11 December 2011, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 (Mar. 15,
2012), https://perma.cc/Q3B2-8VES. The texts of the Kyoto Protocol, the
Copenhagen Accord, the Cancun Agreements, and the Durban Platform for
Enhanced Action are available at Background on the UNFCCC: The International Response to Climate Change, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON
CLIMATE CHANGE, https://perma.cc/7T9Q-BJ8R.
Making Those First Steps Count: An Introduction to the Kyoto Protocol, supra note 26.
Phillip M. Kannan, Mitigating Global Climate Change: Designing a Dynamic Convention to Combat a Dynamic Risk, 36 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y REV. 491, 499–500 (2012). “Inclusion of [Annex I and non-Annex I
differentiation] meant that the Kyoto Protocol failed to be a means of marshaling collective action.” Id. at 499.
Daniel Bodansky, The Paris Climate Agreement: A New Hope?, 110 AM. J.
INT’L L. 288, 292 (2016). (“[T]he Copenhagen Accord, in embryonic form,
pointed the way forward. In contrast to the Kyoto Protocol, which had set
emission reduction targets through a collective process of international negotiations, the Copenhagen Accord established a bottom-up architecture, in
which countries defined their own targets and actions and then recorded
them internationally.”).
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The Paris Agreement continued the bottom-up approach.33
This is achieved by requiring each party to submit its intended
nationally determined contributions (“INDC”) to reducing
greenhouse gas emissions.34 Unlike the Copenhagen Accord, the
Paris Agreement requires the parties to submit a new INDC
every five years.35 Moreover, it states that “[the] successive nationally determined contribution will represent a progression
beyond the Party’s then current nationally determined contribution and reflect its highest possible ambition[.]”36 This strengthened the Paris Agreement by building in the possibilities and
goals of adaptive management and continuous improvement for
all parties.
The Paris Agreement is also strengthened by the inclusion
of procedural standards for developing adaptations,37 providing
financial resources,38 transferring technology,39 reporting data,40 and developing a baseline from which to measure progress.41 These provisions add standards and structure to the
procedures designed to help achieve the substantive goal or substantive policy of “[h]olding the increase in the global average
temperature to well below 2° C above pre-industrial levels . . . .”42
The concept of substantive goals is part of U.S. environmental law and international environmental law. In the U.S., it has
been applied in cases interpreting the National Environmental
Policy Act (“NEPA”). It was first described and applied by Judge
Skelly Wright as follows:
[T]he general substantive policy of the [National Environmental Policy] Act is a flexible one. It leaves room for a responsible exercise of discretion and may not require particular substan33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

See id. for a thorough history and analysis of the Paris Agreement.
Paris Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 4.2 (“Each Party shall prepare,
communicate and maintain successive nationally determined contributions
that it intends to achieve.”).
Id. at art. 4.9.
Id. at art. 4.3.
See id. at art. 7.
Id. at art. 9.
Id. at art. 10.
Id. at art. 13.
Id. at art. 14.
Id. at art. 2.1(a) (emphasis added).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/3
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tive results in particular problematic instances. However, the Act
also contains very important “procedural” provisions—provisions
which are designed to see that all federal agencies do in fact exercise the substantive discretion given them.43
The Supreme Court recognized substantive goals and substantive policies in Strycker’s Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen.44 It did so in interpreting NEPA’s substantive goal regarding
environmental impact statements (“EISs”) for certain federal actions: “to insure a fully informed and well-considered decision.”45
The agency has not satisfied this requirement until it “has made
an adequate compilation of relevant information, has analyzed it
reasonably, has not ignored pertinent data, and has made disclosures to the public.”46
The concept of substantive goals is also recognized in customary international environmental law. This customary international law47 is the doctrine called pacta sunt servanda, which has
been articulated as: “[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the
parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”48 For
example, this law prohibits a party to the Paris Agreement from
committing to “prepare, communicate and maintain successive
nationally determined contributions that it intends to achieve,”49
and then ignoring this commitment. Each party must prepare
and submit a nationally determined contribution, which must
aim at “[h]olding the increase in the global average temperature
to well below 2° C”50 and then make good-faith efforts to comply
with it.
Although neither the substantive goal norm developed in the
domestic law of the U.S. nor the norm that evolved in interna-

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n,
449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (emphasis added).
444 U.S. 223, 227 (1980) (“NEPA . . . establish[ed] significant substantive
goals . . . .”) (quoting Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S.
519, 558 (1978)).
Id. (quoting Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp., 435 U.S. at 558).
See Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 701 F.2d 1011, 1029 (2d Cir.
1983).
See Vienna Convention, supra note 25, for a discussion of the legal status
of pacta sunt servanda as customary international law.
Id. at art. 26.
Paris Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 4.2.
Id. at art. 2.1(a).
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tional law is binding on the other system of governance, each provides a framework for the other system for analyzing the issues
regarding substantive norms. They are models that provide guidance for—not precedents binding on—the other system. Using
this framework and modifying Judge Wright’s articulation of the
purpose of substantive policies quoted above regarding the obligations imposed on federal agencies to reflect the international status of the Paris Agreement, the norm in international law may be
articulated as follows: customary international law, namely pacta
sunt servanda, is “designed to see that all [parties] do in fact exercise the substantive discretion [retained by] them.”51
III. PRESIDENT TRUMP’S ATTEMPT TO CEASE ALL
IMPLEMENTATION AND TO WITHDRAW FROM
THE PARIS AGREEMENT: INCONSISTENT WITH
ARTICLE II, § 2, CL. 2 OF THE CONSTITUTION?
Litigation will be required to test the constitutionality of
President Trump’s actions regarding the Paris Agreement.52
Such litigation will require (1) a plaintiff with standing and (2)
substantive arguments demonstrating the unconstitutionality of
these actions.
A.

Satisfying the Standing Requirement

As noted
States would
Agreement.54
in November

51.
52.
53.
54.

55.

above, President Trump stated53 that the United
comply with the denunciation article in the Paris
At the earliest, the withdrawal would take effect
2019.55 However, President Trump announced on

Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm’n,
449 F.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
See Press Release, supra note 1, for a description of these actions.
Id.
Paris Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 28.1 (“At any time after three years
from the date on which this Agreement has entered into force for a Party,
that Party may withdraw from this Agreement by giving written notification to the Depositary.”); id. at art. 28.2 (“Any such withdrawal shall take
effect upon expiry of one year from the date of receipt by the Depositary of
the notification of withdrawal, or on such later date as may be specified in
the notification of withdrawal.”).
See id. at art. 28.2; STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44761,
WITHDRAWAL FROM INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS: LEGAL FRAMEWORK, THE

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/3
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June 1, 2017 that, “as of today, the United States will cease all
implementation . . . .”56 Thus, any person with a concrete and
particularized individual injury that is actual or imminent, that
is fairly traceable to the cessation of the implementation of the
Paris Agreement, and that would likely be redressed by a favorable decision of the court, should have standing to challenge the
purported cessation of the implementation of the Paris Agreement.57 Massachusetts, or any coastal state, should have standing.58
B. Making Substantive Arguments: The Merits of
Litigation Challenging President Trump’s Actions
A central part of the plaintiff’s case would be grounded in
the principle that compliance with treaty provisions does not
necessarily assure compliance with the U.S. Constitution.59 This
is a self-evident principle because, if it were not valid, the President and the Senate acting alone could amend the Constitution
in violation of its requirements.60 Thus, even if the United
States complies with the withdrawal procedure in the Paris
Agreement,61 that fact alone does not mean it has complied with
the Constitution. Because President Trump took action without
obtaining any authority from either the House or the Senate,

56.
57.

58.

59.

60.
61.

PARIS AGREEMENT, AND THE IRAN NUCLEAR AGREEMENT 17 (2017),
https://perma.cc/MGE9-H4MS.
See Press Release, supra note 1.
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007) (“To ensure the proper adversarial presentation, Lujan holds that a litigant must demonstrate that
it has suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is either actual or
imminent, that the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant, and that it is
likely that a favorable decision will redress that injury.”) (internal citations
omitted).
See id. at 522 (“According to petitioners’ unchallenged affidavits, global sea
levels rose somewhere between 10 and 20 centimeters over the 20th century as a result of global warming. These rising seas have already begun to
swallow Massachusetts’ coastal land.”) (internal citations omitted).
See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 505–06 (2008); see also Matthew J.
Stanford, Odd Man Out, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 929, 975 (2017) (“While some
treaties automatically bear the weight of ordinary legislation (‘selfexecuting’), others require further legislative enactment to become binding
domestic law.”).
U.S. CONST. art V, § 2, cl. 2.
Paris Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 28.
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the question remains: Does the Constitution give the President
the unilateral power claimed in this case?
While the abstract question of whether the Constitution requires that either Congress or the Senate have a role in the decision to withdraw from a treaty “has been the source of historical debate,”62 that question regarding this particular treaty can
be resolved by an analysis of the UNFCCC. The UNFCCC states
that each party shall have one vote in discussions and decisions of
the COP.63 Moreover, the UNFCCC does not change the customary international law that in treaties, “those who do not agree
simply do not become bound.”64 Thus, for decisions to be adopted
by its COP of the UNFCCC, unanimous consent is required.
Article 7 of the UNFCCC is pivotal to the argument over the
constitutionality of President Trump’s unilateral order to halt
implementation of the Paris Agreement. Thus, I first discuss and
analyze its relevant provisions in preparation for the argument.
Article 7 of the UNFCCC specifies the responsibilities and
duties of the COP, thereby creating its authority.65 Of particular
importance to the argument developed herein is the following
subsection:

62.

63.
64.

65.

See MULLIGAN, supra note 55, at 6. See also Phillip M. Kannan, Reinstating
Treaty-Making with Native American Tribes, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
809, 815 n.36 (2008) (analyzing the conflicting opinions on this topic and
citing references); David A. Wirth, Executive Agreements Relying on Implied Statutory Authority: A Response to Bodansky and Spiro, 50 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 741, 741 (2017) (“Until recently, the law surrounding executive agreements has been a subject of attention from a relatively small
number of academics concerned with foreign relations law, along with
State Department lawyers who have a need to deploy the underlying concepts in concrete determinations.”); David A. Wirth, The International and
Domestic Law of Climate Change: A Binding International Agreement
Without the Senate or Congress?, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 515, 515 (2015)
(arguing that an international agreement can become binding without either Senate advice and consent or new congressional legislation).
UNFCCC, supra note 7, at art. 18.
Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International Environmental Law, 86
AM. J. INT’L L. 259, 278 (1992) (“Herein lies a fundamental difference between the legislative and the diplomatic process. With legislation everyone
is bound by the outcome, including those who do not agree. With treaties
those who do not agree simply do not become bound.”).
UNFCCC, supra note 7, at art. 7.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/3
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The Conference of the Parties . . . may adopt, and shall make,
within its mandate, the decisions necessary to promote the effective implementations of the Convention. To this end, it shall . . .
(m) Exercise such other functions as are required for the
achievement of the objectives of the Convention as well as all
other functions assigned to it under the Convention.66

By this provision, all parties, including the United Sates,
have yielded sovereignty to the COP to make decisions that are
binding on all parties. It is an example of a norm-making article—that is, an article in a treaty that specifies how future obligations for all Parties may be created without going through the
amendment or ratification procedures specified elsewhere in the
treaty.67 Sir Geoffrey Palmer called the inclusion of a normmaking article “prolepsis.”68 He summarized prolepsis as follows:
Procedures for the creation of norms are agreed upon. Those procedures include a provision that in respect of certain rules or in
certain circumstances unanimous consent is not required. The
norms created by using the procedures did not necessarily receive
unanimous consent but are binding on any nation that did not
consent because they were created by agreed procedures. Nations
thus consent in advance to be bound by norms whose content is
unknown at the time of the consent.69

An example of the successful application of prolepsis can be
found in the Montreal Protocol. It includes prolepsis to make adjustments and reductions (but only these two parameters) applicable to the production or consumption of the ozone-depleting
substances controlled under the protocol. The following provision
achieves this:
The Parties may decide whether . . . adjustments and reductions
of production or consumption of the controlled substances should
66.
67.

68.
69.

Id. at art. 7.2(m).
Palmer, supra note 64, at 273. See also Phillip M. Kannan, Mitigating
Global Climate: Designing a Dynamic Convention to Combat a Dynamic
Risk, 36 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 491, 514 (2012) (“Once the
norm-creating procedure is agreed to by states, when it is applied to create
a norm, all states that consented to the procedure are bound by the norm,
whether or not they agree with it.”).
Palmer, supra note 64, at 273.
Id. (emphasis added).
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be undertaken and, if so, the scope, amount and timing . . . . In
taking such decisions, the Parties shall make every effort to
reach agreement by consensus. If all efforts at consensus have
been exhausted, and no agreement reached, such decision shall,
as a last resort, be adopted by a two-thirds majority vote of the
Parties present and voting [representing a majority of developed
and developing Parties].70

The following is an example of how this provision was applied
in the Montreal Protocol. For developed states and certain ozonedepleting chemicals, the target production and consumption levels were reduced from 100% of 1986 levels by August 1, 1989 to
0% of 1986 levels by (and for any time following) January 1,
2010.71 This dramatic achievement demonstrates the power of
prolepsis.
Pursuant to the UNFCCC, the COP unanimously adopted
the Paris Agreement on January 29, 2016.72 It created prolepsis
by including the following provision: “[t]o this end, [the COP]
shall . . . [e]xercise such other functions as are required for the
achievement of the objective of the Convention as well as all other
functions assigned to it under the Convention.”73 The Paris
Agreement’s goals include “enhancing the implementation of the
[UNFCCC] by . . . aim[ing to hold] the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2° C.”74 This objective of the Paris Agreement is required75 to achieve the objectives of UNFCCC:

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer arts.
2(9)(a), (c), Sept. 16, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-10
(1987).
Amendment to the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer art. 2A(8), Sept. 21, 2007, 2173 U.N.T.S. 183.
Paris Agreement, supra note 2.
UNFCCC, supra note 7, at art. 7.2(m).
Paris Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 2.1(a) (emphasis added).
Bob Silberg, Why a Half-Degree Temperature Rise is a Big Deal, NASA
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE (June 29, 2016) (“[T]he jump from 1.5 to 2 degrees—a third more of an increase—raises the impact by about that same
fraction, very roughly, on most of the phenomena the study covered. Heat
waves would last around a third longer, rain storms would be about a third
more intense, the increase in sea level would be approximately that much
higher and the percentage of tropical coral reefs at risk of severe degradation would be roughly that much greater.”), https://perma.cc/7K3Q-ESJM.
See also Fred Pearce, What Would a Global Warming of 1.5 Degrees Increase Be Like?, YALE ENV’T 360 (June 16, 2016), https://perma.cc/CFY3-
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“[t]he ultimate objective of this Convention . . . is to achieve . . .
stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere
at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.”76 Thus, when the COP adopted the
Paris Agreement, it applied its authority to “exercise such other
functions as are required for the achievement of the objectives of
the [UNFCCC].”77 Therefore, when the United States became a
party to the Paris Agreement, it was acting in conformance with
the U.S. Constitution because the Senate had given its advice and
consent via prolepsis.
The above argument based on prolepsis is critical to challenging President Trump’s actions. If the courts ultimately reject prolepsis and consider the Paris Agreement in isolation, the outcome
may change.
The framework for the final argument on the merits developed in this Essay is the structure articulated by Justice Jackson
to determine the President’s constitutional powers. He stated:
“[The President’s constitutional powers] are not fixed, but fluctuate, depending on their disjunction or conjunction with those of
Congress.”78 He then developed a hierarchical structure with
three levels of a President’s constitutional powers as follows:
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum,
for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that
Congress can delegate. In these circumstances, and in these only,
may he be said (for what it may be worth) to personify the federal
sovereignty.
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own
independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he
and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.

76.
77.
78.

DCNR (discussing the risks of a 2 degree increase in global warming compared to the risks of a 1.5 degree increase).
UNFCCC, supra note 7, at art. 2.
Id. at art. 7.2(m).
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).

13

2018]

Pres. Trump’s Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement 305

3. When the President takes measures incompatible with
the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb . . . .79

Justice Jackson’s framework has been called “[the] familiar tripartite framework” and adopted in several Supreme Court opinions.80
The United States became a party to the Paris Agreement
through the acts of President Obama.81 When he agreed to the
United States being bound by the Paris Agreement and submitted its initial NDIC, his presidential authority was at its maximum because these actions were pursuant to an express authorization of the Senate. The express authorization was given when
the Senate gave its advice and consent to the UNFCCC82—in particular, to the prolepsis mechanism in Article 7.2(m).83
When President Trump issued his order for the United States
to cease implementation of the Paris Agreement,84 his presidential authority was at its minimum. His actions were incompatible
with the express or implied will of the Senate—namely, the advice and consent given by the Senate to the UNFCCC including
Article 7.2(m), which is the prolepsis provision, and Article 2,
which states the objectives of the UNFCCC that conflict with
President Trump’s actions.
IV. CONCLUSION
The question presented in the title of this Essay can be answered only by resolving the mutually exclusive actions taken by
two presidents, President Obama and President Trump. In this
79.
80.

81.
82.

83.
84.

Id. at 635–37.
Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2083 (2015) (“In considering claims of
Presidential power this Court refers to Justice Jackson’s familiar tripartite
framework from [his concurrence in] Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer . . . .”) (internal citations omitted).
See Paris Agreement – Status of Ratification, U.N. FRAMEWORK
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, https://perma.cc/3Y92-9BUB (listing the
United States as a Party).
George H. W. Bush, Statement on Signing the Instrument of Ratification
for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Oct.
13, 1992), collected by THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT,
https://perma.cc/YXH2-E8TK.
See supra notes 68–71 and accompanying text.
See Press Release, supra note 1.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol35/iss2/3
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Essay, I propose using the framework developed by Justice Jackson to resolve these contradictory actions. The action taken by
President Obama was in conjunction with the Senate; that taken
by President Trump was in disjunction with both the Senate and
the House. In exercising his presidential powers, President
Obama’s authority was “at its maximum.” In exercising his presidential powers, President Trump’s authority was “at its lowest
ebb.” Given this disparity, it is likely that the answer to the question posed in the title of this article is “no.”
If the answer were “yes,” and if President Trump does not
serve a second term, a subsequent President could assert the unilateral power relied on by President Trump to reverse his decision.
Upholding a President’s unilateral authority to withdraw
from and stop implementing treaties not submitted to the Senate
under Article II, § 2, Clause 2 and not based on legislation will
introduce instability into such treaties to which the United States
is a party. They will become no more than executive orders of a
President that can, in effect, be ended by a unilateral decision of
that President or any later President. The international community would not be able to rely on commitments made by the United States in such treaties; such treaties will cease to be an effective means for achieving international governance.
President Trump could avoid the points of contention discussed above and maintain confidence in treaty-making as an effective means of global governance if he acted in conjunction with
the Senate by seeking its advice and consent. Otherwise, litigation challenging his unilateral assertion of authority will surely
be brought. It is the contention of this Essay that this litigation
will likely ultimately result85 in a final decision finding President
Trump’s actions unconstitutional.
President Trump’s approach to the Paris Agreement is contrary to Justice Black’s well-known maxim: “[g]reat nations, like

85.

The argument developed in this Essay is a viable strategy for challenging
President Trump’s action; it is not a roadmap to a predetermined destination. See supra p. 305 (“The above argument based on prolepsis given
above is critical to challenging President Trump’s actions. If the courts ultimately reject prolepsis and consider the Paris Agreement in isolation, the
outcome may change.”)
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great men, should keep their word.”86 The United States gave its
word to be bound by the Paris Agreement. A change in administrations does not create the power in the new President—one
individual—to unilaterally change the commitments of the United
States—a sovereign state. In a conflict between the action of a
sovereign state taken in accordance with its constitution and the
unilateral action taken by the head of one branch of a later regime violative of a provision in that constitution, the former must
prevail.

86.

Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960)
(Black, J. dissenting) (emphasis added).
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